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This paper asserts that religious conflicts and the emergence of Boko 
Haram in northern Nigeria are linked to the influence of theology or 
theological interpretation. The paper specifically argues that 
religious conflicts and the emergence of Boko Haram are strongly 
influenced by Maududian ideology or his political interpretation of 
Islam. The paper establishes this by showing that “Ikhwan al-
Muslimun (Muslim Brotherhood) of Egypt, the Jama’at-i-Islami of 
Pakistan, the Wahabbi views in Saudi Arabia and Islamic revolution 
of Iran are all indirect propagators of Maududian ideology. This 
fundamentalist ideological influence in northern Nigeria began with 
Muslim Student Society (MSS) in northern Nigerian universities and 
was transmitted into the northern Nigerian society at large with dire 
consequences. This position is supported by interviews conducted of 
159 respondents in Kano, Zaria and Kaduna of Kano and Kaduna 
states of northern Nigeria.  
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Islamic militancy or fundamentalism
2
 is now a global phenomenon. 
In recent times, Boko Haram, a militant Islamic group, has taken 
                                                          
1
 This is derived from Maududi whose complete name is 
AbulAlaMaududi. He is referred to as the godfather of fundamentalism 
((The Spittoon 2010). 
2
 Several scholars and Islamists reject the use of fundamentalism 
because of its Christian roots and that it paints Islam in bad light. However, 
this writer finds support for its use in Voll who refers to Maududian 
tendency as ‘fundamentalist activism’ (1994, 237).  It captures the 
aggressive tendency being portrayed.  




captive several towns in north eastern Nigeria in a bid to establish an 
Islamic state.Several scholars in Nigeria have attempted to decipher 
the root cause of these religious conflicts and indeed the rise of Boko 
Haram in northern Nigeria. 
Depending on the scholar, politicians, poverty and oppression as 
well as colonialism (Turaki 2010)
3
 have been proffered as laying the 
foundation or promoting Islamic fundamentalism and the emergence 
of Boko Haram.Essentially, most scholars believe that religious 
conflicts and Boko Haram emerged as a result of socio-political and 
socio-economic factors. This paper questions the sufficiency of this 
claim and argues that theology and theological interpretation or 
indoctrination are the root cause, while socio-political and socio-
economic factors are secondary because in spite of socio-political 
and socio-economic factors, Islam existsin other parts of Nigeria 
without these crises.  
The central argument of this paper is that both religious conflicts 
and the emergence of Boko Haram are as a result of theological 
ideology and essentially the fundamentalist ideology of Maududi 
and the Salafi tendency. This paper argues that the arrival of 





The Northern Nigerian Context 
Northern Nigeria is where majority of Muslims reside in Nigeria. 





 Centuries as a result of Arab traders (Elaigwu and 
Galadima 2003, 16) although Ousman suggests that Islam came to 
northern Nigeria around the seventh century (2004, 76). There is a 
                                                          
3
 The Turabian parenthetical referencing style is applied for this paper.  
4
 Most of the ideas in this paper are part of research work done in 
pursuit of a PhD at Africa International University Nairobi-Kenya. 
Interviews that would be referred to in the later part of the paper are 
interviews conducted between April and May of 2015 in Kano, Kaduna and 
Zaria of 159 Muslims. The title is Religious Fundamentalism in Northern 
Nigeria: An Examination of the Impact of Maududi’s Political 
Interpretation of Islam on the Rise of Religious Conflicts in Kano and 
Kaduna States, Northern Nigeria and Its Effect on Christian-Muslim 
Relations. 




general consensus that Kanem Bornu Empire is the first to be 
Islamized (Alaon.d., 6; Yusuf 2007, 238). Kane is reported to 
suggest A. D. 666-67 for the arrival of Islam to Chad region by a 
small group of Muslims under the leadership of Uqbah bin Nafi. The 
Kings of Kanem Bornu only received Islam around the 11
th
 Century 
(Sanusi 2007, 179). Islam reigned there for centuries until the British 
colonized northern Nigeria (Yusuf 2007, 238; Alaon.d., 6).  
The second critical phase in the spread of Islam in northern 
Nigeria and beyond is the UsmanDanfodio jihad of the 19
th
 Century 
that established the Sokoto Caliphate, despite the fact that Islam has 
been in Hausa land since the 15
th
 Century, especially in Kano (Yusuf 
2007, 238; Hunwick 1992, 145). This jihad, within 50 years, swept 
the entire Hausa land and extended to former Bornu provinces, the 
Jukun and Nupe land as far as Oyo Empire in western Nigeria 
(Falola and Heaton 2008, 61, 65; Fwatshak 2006, 261-262, Schacht 
1957, 123-129). In spite of the fact that Kalu (2004) reported that 
nine jihads occurred before the 19
th
 Century, most scholars agree 
that it is the Danfodio jihad that accounted for the spread of Islam in 
Nigeria (Yusuf 2007, 239; Christelow 2002, 187) until colonialists 
introduced indirect rule. 
Falola suggests that resource mobilization is behind the adoption 
of indirect rule by colonialists (1998, 27). Turaki in his works of 
1993, 1999, 2010 severally argues the impact of indirect rule on 
Muslim and non-Muslim relations in northern Nigeria. Turaki 
concluded that “contemporary Christian-Muslim relations in 
Northern Nigeria are rooted in the bitter enmity that existed between 
Muslims and non-Muslims because of the dehumanising effects of 
colonialism and slavery” (2010, 168). 
Without question, colonial legacy contributed to the enmity 
between Muslims and non-Muslims. However, the argument here is 
that the emergence of new Islamic sects introduced changes in the 
Islamic movement in northern Nigeria.
5
 These new sects began to 
interpret Islam in their own way. As shall be seen, Maududi 
contributed to this reinterpretation of Islam. 
                                                          
5
 Sects emerge predominantly due to differences in theological 
interpretation. 




The preceding makes this paper stress the inadequacy of 
ethnicity, poverty, illiteracy, media or politics (Ibrahim 1987, 68-69, 
76-81) as exclusive or main causes of religious conflicts or 
fundamentalism in northern Nigeria. Clarke rightly argues that it 
will be “misleading, nevertheless, to interpret all recent 
fundamentalism in Nigeria, or for that matter all recent outbreaks of  
religious controversy and violence, in this way” (1988, 525). One 
agrees with Coulon that the religious re-composition we are seeing 
in Nigeria today is not a mechanical response to political and 
economic crises (cited in Ibrahim 1991, 115).  
Elaigwu and Galadima also discredit the quest for Shari’a 
implementation in northern Nigeria as a factor causing religious 
conflicts because Shari’a has always existed in northern Nigeria. It 
is the nature and mode of Shari’a implementation that is the issue 
(2003, 144). This alludes to the influence of theological 
interpretation or ideology. To buttress the claim for theological 
influence further, there is a need to look at the changing phases of 
Islam in northern Nigeria.  
 
The Changing Phases of Islam in Northern Nigeria 
Bala postulates three changing phases of Islam in northern Nigeria. 
These phases are the UsmanDanfodio jihad of 1804, the struggles 
between QadiriyyaSufi order and the newly introduced 
Tijjaniyyaorder of 1825-1960, and the period that witnessed the 
introduction of Izala movement and the unified Qadiriyya and 
Tijjaniyyasufi orders of 1979 (2006, 82). The first phase between 
1804 and later part of 19
th
 Century was consolidation period and 
intellectual awareness characterized by preaching, teaching, and 
writing of literature. The second phase was the period of struggle for 
supremacy between the two main sects of Qadiriyya and Tijjaniya. 
The third phase was the period heralding the emergence of several 
groups laying claim to superiority over the other, a period described 
as witnessing serious transformation among Muslim intellectual 
class (Bala 2006, 83-85). This period has persisted until this day. 
This period also coincides with the period Clarke says Muslims 
in Nigeria, due to internal and external religious, political and 
economic developments, were roused to be conspicuously involved 




in national and international politics.
6
 The period also saw the 
arrival of missionaries from Pakistan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and 
Syria, which according to him forged closer ties with “co-
religionists” in Asia, Middle East and North Africa. It is also the 
period that saw more Nigerian Muslim students trained in Islamic 
universities such as Al-Azhar of Cairo (Clarke 1988, 532).  
Consequently, the mid-1970s saw an upsurge in Islamic 
fundamentalism intolerant of non-Muslims. This dimension of 
fanaticism and intolerance found expression in dramatic ways 
through the activities of Maitatsine, Izala and Muslim Student 
Society (MSS) movements (Ibrahim 1987, 70). Led by a mixture of 
modern educated contemporary class of intellectuals and orthodox 
Muslim clerics (Sanusi 2007, 177), Islamic movements in Nigeria 
accepted jihad and martyrdom as crucial to the establishment of a 
true Islamic state (Ousman 2004, 77). This concept is of Maududian 
inspiration as we shall see below which was imbibed by university 
students. It will later spread into the northern Nigerian society and is 
linked to the emergence of Boko Haram.  
 
Maududi and His Philosophy 
AbulAla Maududi was a Pakistani Islamic scholar of Indian origin, 
who moved to Pakistan after the partitioning of the Indian sub-
continent in 1947, where he assumed the political role of the main 
advocate for an Islamic state. Maududi was born in 1903 and died in 
1979. He was born in Awrangabad of Hyderabad, a state in present 
day India, and into a strong Muslim family. He wrote over 120 
works reflecting various aspects of Islam.
7
 
                                                          
6
 This coincides with the spread of Maududi’s ideology, which says 
you can’t be a true Muslim and remain indifferent to political, cultural, 
social, economic and international politics.  
7
 For a more detailed biography of Maududi consult Encyclopedia of 
World Biography on Abu-I A'laMawdudi, Encyclopedia of the Middle East 
on Mawdudi, Nasr (1995), Rahman and Ali (2012, 233), Armajani (2012, 
164-164), Adams (1983, 100-111) and Nasr (1996, 9-26). The following 
website also provided the timelines in Maududi’s biography: 
http://aamaududifsl.blogspot.com/2010/01/biography-of-abul-aala-
maududi-rahi-of.html 




Maududi is acclaimed as one of the foundation stones of the 
20
th
–century Islamic resurgence and most read Muslim writer of his 
time. Islamic scholars credit Maududi with the development of 
political interpretation of Islam. Nasr states that the essence of 
Maududi’s message is distinct from “the teaching and worldview of 
traditional Islam within the debate in which his vision took shape” 
(1996, 6). He argues, as did Zakaria (2010, 721), that Maududi is the 
first Islamic thinker to develop a “systematic political reading of 
Islam and a plan for social action to realize his vision” (1996, 3). 
Ayoob adds that “Maududi is the most seminal thinker of all the 
ideologues of the Islamist movement. His approach to Islam was 
quintessentially political” (2008, 66). Cheema credits Maududi with 
making the creation of an Islamic state a religious duty to struggle 
for just like other religious obligations (2013, 52). Qutb and others 
only interpreted this concept further.  
A detailed discussion on Maududi’s influence on Qutb is not 
possible here. However, reference to two works will suffice. 
Rahman and Ali, in their content analysis of Maududi’s ideas in 
Qutb’s works, concluded that Maududi’s Islamic thoughts were a 
paramount influence on Qutb, and his joining of Ikhwanin 1951 was 
a significant moment in his Islamic activism (2012, 235; cf Calvert 
2010, 157-158). 
Woktorowicz corroborates Rahman and Ali with this copious 
quote, which says: 
 
Mawdudi’s importance for the Egyptian stream is 
his impact on SayyidQutb, often seen as the 
godfather of revolutionary Sunni Islam (he was 
executed by Nasser in 1966). Qutb read Mawdudi’s 
most influential works, including Jihad in Islam, 
Islam and Jahiliyya, and Principles of Islamic 
Government, which were translated into Arabic 
beginning in the 1950s. A more direct connection 
existed through one of Mawdudi’s most important 
protégés, Abdul Hasan Ali Nadvi, who was a central 
figure in transmitting his mentor’s theories to the 
Arab world. In 1950, Nadvi wrote What Did the 
World Lose Due to the Decline of Islam?, a book 




published in Arabic that expounded on Mawdudi’s 
theory of modern jahiliyya. When he first travelled 
to the Middle East in 1951, Nadvi met with Qutb, 
who had already read his book. Both Mawdudi and 
Nadvi are quoted at length in Qutb’sIn the Shade of 
the Qu’ran, published in 1953 (2005, 78-79; cf 
Sivan 1985, 23). 
 
Furthermore, in the editor’s comment to Maududi’s book of 
1960, the renowned Islamic scholar Khurshid Ahmad says it is no 
exaggeration to say that by the time of his death, Maududi “had 
become the most widely read Muslim author of our time, 
contributing immensely to the contemporary resurgence of Islamic 
ideas, feelings and activity all over the world” (Maududi 1960, 13; 
cfRahman and Ali 2012, 235; Adams 1983, 99). Zakaria affirms that 
Maududi is arguably the one who gave a modern meaning to Umma 
as one that is separate and distinct from a secular-national 
community (2010, 721), and universal in nature (Ayoob 2008, 67). 
Ayubi seems to agree when he argues that nowhere in the Qur’an or 
subsequent writing of Muslim authors is ummagiven unequivocally 
religious connotation (1991, 3), and so “the main Qur’anic concept 
of the body politic (umma). . . is not necessarily a religious one” 
(1991, 91 italics original).  
In fact, Wood argues that Maududi established “a religiopolitical 
idiom for Islamic fundamentalism” (2011, 174). This is in line with 
Nasr’s claim that it is Maududi’s “creation of a coherent Islamic 
ideology, articulated in terms of the elaborate organization of an 
Islamic state” that provided the essential breakthrough leading to the 
rise of contemporary revivalism (1996, 3). Indeed, Ayubi 
acknowledges that “one of the most important contemporary sources 
for the doctrine of political Islam” is the writings of Maududi (1991, 
96). Politics is important to Maududi because he believes it is the 
most “legitimate vehicle for the manifestation of Islamic revelation” 
and the sole means for the expression of Islamic spirituality (Ayoob 
2008, 67). In his model, Wood traced the genealogy of 
fundamentalist ideology from Maududi through Qutb to 
contemporary fundamentalist discourse. He cited Nasr, in another 




work, as labelling fundamentalism as Maududi’s ‘brainchild’ (2011, 
174).  
Nasr states that “his prolific writings have not only made him 
the foremost revivalist thinker of his time, but have also confirmed 
his place as an important force in traditional religious scholarship.” 
He went further to say that “Mawdudi's ideological perspective, one 
of the most detailed and compelling articulations of the revivalist 
position, has been influential in the unfolding of revivalism across 
the Muslim world” (1995, 49, 50). Moten affirms Maududi’s 
“writings have greatly contributed to the articulation of Islamic 
revivalist thought and has influenced Muslim thinkers and activists 
all over the world” (2004, 247).  
Maududialso shaped ideologies and territories. He postulated 
ideas that provided theoretical basis for Islamization of knowledge 
(Moten 2004), he influenced Islamic discourse on human rights with 
over 40 titles (Idris 2003), and promoted Islamic renaissance 
fundamentalism (Ahmad 1967). Tibi recognizes Maududi as the 
intellectual father of Islamic fundamentalism (1998, 42) while Wood 
is categorical that Maududi “provided fundamentalism with its key 
vocabulary” (2011, 174). Khalidi (2003) and Moten (2003) expose 
his influence on political discourse in India and Pakistan, and 
Ahmad (2003) discloses how Maududi influenced discussion on 
Shari’a.  
Maududi’s pertinent ideologies are summarized hereafter. 
Maududiis the advocate of the modern concept of non-separation of 
Islam and the state (Din waDawla) and justifies militant jihad or use 
of the ‘sword’ to enforce Shari’aon all mankind (1980, 7, 9, 16-18). 
He insists that Islam must capture all state authority and make it 
Islamic (1980, 19), destroy and eliminate all un-Islamic rule and 
establish Islamic rule (1980, 22; 1964, 64), and achieve global 
Islamization (1980, 5, 22; 1964, 64). Jihad is also necessary to 
prohibit non-Islamic way of life in an Islamic state (1980, 27-28), 
disallow un-Islamic religious propagation and make conversion from 
Islam impossible (1981, 32, 73), and enforce the exit of non-
Muslims from the Islamic state who refuse to embrace Islam (1981, 
80-81) because multi-religious co-existence is not allowed in an 
Islamic state (1981, 72-73). 
 




The Presence of Maududi’s Ideology in Northern Nigeria 
In a research carried out in Kano and Kaduna States, some of these 
ideologies were variedly expressed by several interviewees in the 
three cities mentioned in footnote 4 above. For example, 110 out of 
159 interviewees believe that various forms of jihad are necessary in 
modern northern Nigeria and 138 interviewees accept that jihad of 
different forms is obligatory to all Muslims just as Maududi 
espoused. 84 interviewees agree that jihad is an instrument to 
remove un-Islamic governments which again agrees with Maududi’s 
position on jihad stated above, while 75 interviewees agree that jihad 
and Islamic state is a solution to all Muslim problems.  
 
Maududian Influence on Religious Conflicts and Boko Haram in 
Northern Nigeria 
Ahmad  states that Egypt was actually the first country where 
Maududi’s writings initiated new waves of thought within Islamic 
circles, then Sudan in 1952 and the following countries: Turkey, 
Syria, Iraq, Indonesia, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Nigeria, 
South Africa, Kenya as well as elsewhere (2003, 533 italics mine). 
This clearly affirms Maududi’s influence in Nigeria and below is the 
argument of how he shaped fundamentalism in northern Nigeria.  
 
The Sudan and Muslim Student Society (MSS) Connection 
In synthesizing how Maududi influenced fundamentalism in 
northern Nigeria, it is pertinent to echo Esposito who says that al-
Banna, Qutb’s Muslim Brotherhood and Maududi’s Jama’at-i-
Islami “are indeed the trailblazers or architects of contemporary 
Islamic revivalism, men whose ideas and methods have been studied 
and emulated from Sudan to Indonesia” (1999, 129). Jami’u also 
drew our attention to the fact that the major external influence on 
Muslim Student Society (MSS)in northern Nigeria which propelled 
its growth to embrace Islamic resurgence are the “Ikhwan al-
Muslimun(Muslim Brotherhood) of Egypt, the Jama’at-i-Islamiof 
Pakistan, the Wahabbi views in Saudi Arabia and Islamic revolution 
of Iran” (2012, 294).  Evidence is provided below that these groups 
are all carriers of Maududi’s ideology. This is to support the 
argument that Qutb and Muslim brotherhood, Khomeini and Saudi 
Arabia provide an indirect Maudidian influence in northern Nigeria.  




Jackson (2011, 2) reveals that Khomeini found 
Maududi’stheodemocracyfitting for Shi’a political thought and 
translated his works into Farsi. Jenkins (2008) in his article affirmed 
that Khomeini met Maududi as early as 1963, which led to the 
translation of Maududi’s works into Farsi and subsequently laced his 
revolutionary rhetoric from Maududi’s writings. The New World 
Encyclopediaexposes theinfluence of Maududi on Saudi Arabian 
state and universities. It reported that Maududi was on the academic 
council of the University in Medina from 1962 and a member of the 
Foundation of the Rabitah al-Alam al-Islami (The Muslim World 
League) in Mecca. This is the same movement Jami’u reports of 
having a major influence on MSS also (2012, 297). Maududi’s 
influence on Qutb is already discussed above. These movements 
coalesced into a heavy influence on the MSS movement in northern 
Nigerian universities. 
 
Sudan: the Gateway to Maududi’s Fundamentalist Ideology in 
Northern Nigeria 
Sudan has been heavily influenced by Maududi’s ideologies since 
early 1950s (Osman 2003, 465). The Ikhwanof Sudan and Nigeria 
took his writings as a major source for the development of their 
agenda for Islamic social change (Ahmad 2003, 533, Falola 1998, 
10). Jami’u reveals that northern Nigeria had very close ties with 
Mahdi movement of Sudan even during colonial times and reported 
the colonialists’ attempt to disconnect this close ties the Muslim 
communities of northern Nigeria had with the Mahdi movement of 
Sudan (2012, 81). Furthermore, the School of Arabic studies in 
Kano attended by late Abubakar Gumi (chief patron of the Izala 
sect) and El-Zakzaky (MSS leader and founder of Nigerian Muslim 
Brotherhood now known as Islamic Movement of Nigeria) had a 
historical relationship with Sudan. Gumi later studied in Sudan 
(Falola 1998,119, 122). It is, therefore, safe to say that Gumi had 
both the Maududian and Wahabbi influence. 
As if in confirmation of Ahmad and Jami’u’s claims above, the 
drafters of the northern Nigeria Penal Code as early as 1958 came 
from Sudan and Pakistan. The later drafters of the 
ZamfaraShari’aPenal Code also extensively consulted with Sudan. 
Importantly  also, it was Gumi, the Grand Khadi of northern Nigeria 




then, who advised the Sardauna of Sokoto (late Ahmadu Bello) to 
establish the Jama’atNasril Islam (JNI) [Society for the Victory of 
Islam] (Jami’u 2012, 288)with its resemblance to 
Maududi’sJama’at-i-Islami of Pakistan. Remember also that one 
major influence on Gumi was Rabitah al-Alam al-Islami (The 
Muslim World League) from Saudi Arabia where Maududi was a 
member. It is interesting that Jami’u connects Islamic resurgence in 
Nigeria to the 1950s and says JNI was established for that purpose 
(Jami’u 2012, 288). This seems to connect northern Nigerian leaders 
then to Islamic fundamentalism.  
 
MSS and the Radicalization of Maududi’s Fundamentalist 
Ideology 
Maududi’s influence on fundamentalism and religious conflicts 
moved from the realm of ideological influence from books to 
militancy through the MSS in northern Nigeria. His ideologies, seen 
earlier, were embraced by MSS leaders and members especially the 
creation of Islamic state through revolution. Some of the 
interviewees out of the 159 Muslims interviewed agree that these 
ideas shaped MSS and galvanized them into action (interview with 
159 Muslims, April – May, 2015). Although as seen above, 
Maududi’s ideas arrived in Nigeria around 1950s (Ahmad 2003, 
533), interviewees believe it was the 1970s (interview with 159 
Muslims, April –May, 2015). An interviewee affirmed the influence 
of Maududi on the MSS by saying that “being an MSS member in so 
many stages, we use to have series of lectures that will tell us . . . 
about his writings, about his principles, about his views of Islamic 
politics and what have you” (interview with KN71, April, 
2015).
8
Jami’u (2012, 294) also reported this influence of Maududi’s 
ideology on MSS students.  
The 1970s is probably recognized as the arrival of Maududi’s 
literature to Nigeria by the interviewees because it coincided with 
what Ibrahim (1987, 71-74) and Clarke (1988, 524) reveal: that it 
was in the 1970s that a fundamentalist fervor was noticed among 
MSS students and so was the adoption of a more missionary and 
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KN71 is the identity given to the 71
st
 interviewee interviewed in 
Kano. 




fundamentalist approach to their activities. A fact also confirmed by 
Jami’u (2012, 5, 294). By this period,the MSS had over 400 
branches. Indeed, Ibrahim states that “since the mid-1970s a 
hardcore extremist leadership has risen in both MSS national 
leadership structure and in the centres of Islamic radicalization in the 
university of Zaria, Kano, and Sokoto” (1987, 73). 
The MSS student embraced Maududi’s ideology of creating an 
Islamic state as a panacea for ameliorating Muslim problems 
especially religious decay and moral decadence (Jami’u 2012, 293). 
Ibrahim (1987, 71-74), Jamiu (2012, 301), Clarke (1988, 524) and 
Ousman (2004, 77) recognize the role of MSS in embracing 
militancy and martyrdom as the process of establishing an Islamic 
state. This militancy is also reflected in the fact that MSS students 
were accused of carrying out the first interfaith conflict of 1982 in 
Kano (Crisis Group 2010, 13). However, it is clearly the MSS 
students who sparked the conflict of 1987 in Advanced Teacher’s 
College, Kafanchan which snowballed across the whole northern 
region and became the benchmark for all subsequent interfaith 
conflicts.  
The MSS acceptance of revolution as the pathway to achieving 
an Islamic state, tallied with Maududi’s ideology that an Islamic 
state cannot succeed without Islamic revolution (1980, 5, 9, 22; 
cfEnayat 2005, 102; Nasr 1996, 70; Armanjani 2012, 169-171; 
Jackson 2011, 146; Haddad 1983, 17-19). However, there was a split 
within MSS. Some preferred the path of revolution to establish an 
Islamic state because as El-Zakzaky said, gradual reformation is a 
“mere scholastic and academic romanticism” (cited in Jami’u 2012, 
301-303). Under the leadership of this radical MSS leadership, the 
MSS within northern universities, especially Ahmadu Bello 
University, had several conflicts and clashes with the university 
authorities and government over Shari’a issues.
9
 
El-Zakzaky and several MSS leaders were arrested and detained 
by state authorities severally and eventually he and several other 
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 It is only through this research that the researcher came to understand 
the influence and motivation behind these conflicts and clashes with MSS 
students in universities and higher institutions in the late 1970s and early 
1980s before they snowballed into the society as a whole in the late 1980s.  




students were not permitted to graduate from Ahmadu Bello 
University. This dismissal and detentions made them popular among 
their colleagues and they gained sympathizers and followers among 
the youths in the society (Jami’u 2012, 303). El-Zakzaky and several 
others will eventually form their own movements
10
 and the 
revolution moved from the campus into the society with dire 
consequences. This also coincided with the Iranian revolution. The 
revolution stressed the possibility of achieving an Islamic state 
through revolution and gave a major push to the movement for the 
creation of an Islamic state through revolution. It is even safe to say 
that the Iranian revolution was influenced by Maududian ideology 
considering his influence on Khomeini seen above.   
Ibrahim (1991, 123), Sanneh (2003, 240) and Sanusi (2007, 177) 
reveal that initially these militant reformers were a united MSS, but 
later split to be composed of educated middle class elements. Many 
of these became leaders, preachers and scholars that ignited the 
proliferation of preachers being presently experienced in northern 
Nigeria and considered as source of conflicts by majority of those 
interviewed. Like El-Zakzaky, they garnered followers and 
continued disseminating these fundamentalist ideas in the society. 
This seems to account for the strong presence of Maududian 
ideologies among interviewees.  
Considering that the Boko Haram leader was once part of El-
Zakzaky’s movement, it is plausible to say that Boko Haram is part 
of the continuing breakaway of radical groups. And we shall see 
below that the Maududian ideology is identified as part of Boko 
Haram’s philosophy. Interviewees say Boko Haram leader broke 
away to start preaching and that he is also an admirer of Maududi 
referred to as jihadist by an interviewee (focus group interview with 
students in Zaria, May, 2015). According to Falola (1998, 3), the 
anti-proselytization war, also a source of conflict (interview with 
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Kalu 2004, Alao (n.d.). Sanneh (2003, 237) and Christelow (2002, 
197) all acknowledged the role of El-Zakzaky in Islamic radicalization in 
northern Nigeria.  




159 Muslims, April-May, 2015)
11
 started with radical Islamic 
students in northern Nigeria. Anti-proselytization is a strong 
Maududian ideology (1981, 32, 73). 
As seen above, fundamentalism starts with ideology and 
transforms into militancy. The position of Jami’u (a university don) 
that Shari’a can be implemented in a multi-religious Nigeria (2012, 
63), a Maududian position that modern state could be efficiently run 
by Islamic principles (Ushama and Osmani 2006, 96), is 
fundamentalism awaiting future radicalization. Clarke is right that 
differentiating fundamentalists and moderates in northern Nigeria, 
when it comes to the issue of Islamic state, is difficult. Both groups 
will love to see Nigeria become an Islamic state (1988, 532). This 
position is virtually taken by all the 159 interviewees. Ayubi is spot 
on that “the now widely held opinion among Muslims that Islam is 
both ‘a religion and a State’ (Din waDawla) is a measure of the 
extraordinary intellectual influence of the modern fundamentalist 
thesis on mainstream Muslim opinion” (1991, 3). 
 
The Boko Haram Movement 
Opinions have been expressed that Boko Haram has links with the 
1980 Maitatsine uprising in Kano (Adesoji 2010, 2011; Pham 2012, 
1; Isichei 1987). This is probably because both their beliefs are not 
held by majority of Nigerian Muslims (Pham 2012, 1-2). However, 
it is tenable to say that there are diverse opinions about the origin of 
the group (Olojo 2013, 2-3; Mohammed 2010, 40), and the group is 
continuously evolving (Mohammed 2014, 10).  
The name Boko Haram is a populist one given to the group by 
people or as profiled by the media (Mohammed 2010, 27). The 
actual name of the group is Jama’atAhl us-Sunnahli’d-
Da’wahwa’lJihad, which in English means The Group of the People 
of Sunnah for Preaching and Struggle (Murtada 2012, 3). There is 
another version not commonly reported, which is “Ahl as-Sunnahwa 
al-Jama’ahalaMinhaj as-Salaf, which means People of the Way of 
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The idea that proselytization is a source conflict is expressed by 
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the Prophet Muhammad and the Community” (Mohammed 2010, 
27).   
The term “Boko Haram” is a coinage combining Hausa and 
Arabic. Bokobeing a Hausa term for western education to which 
haram, Arabic term for forbidden, is attached.  This can be 
translated to mean western education is forbidden.Murtada provides 
a more expanded explanation of the term BokoHaram (2012, 4).  
There is a sense in which the argument for Maitatsine link to 
Boko Haram appears persuasive. This is because both groups 
attacked established Muslim order. There is an external dimension to 
them. Both use marginalized groups, perpetrate intra-Islamic 
conflicts and receive alleged government support (Alaon.d. 16) as 
some governors and political elites are accused of providing 
financial support to them. However, major differences exist that 
raise questions to this link. Maitatsine group advocated the use of 
mystical powers and charms, but the leader of BokoHaram in an 
interview states that Allah condemns sihiri (magic) (Mohammed 
2010, 104). Mohammed Marwa, the Maitatsine leader, claimed 
divine revelation that supersedes that of the prophet (Alaon.d. 16), 
but Boko Haram acknowledges that only Muhammad had divine 
revelation and must be followed.  
Boko Haram is considered a political organization in contrast to 
Maitatsine group. In his abstract, de Montclos argues that Boko 
Haram  “is political because it contests Western values, challenges 
the secularity of the Nigerian state, and reveals the corruption of a 
‘democracy’ that relies on a predatory ruling elite, the so-called 
‘godfathers’” (2014, 135, 136).
12
MSS students have also expressed 
similar concern in their quest for an Islamic revolution mentioned 
above. Moreover, Clarke believes that Maitatsine group is not 
fundamentalist or a product of Muslims (1988, 525). In fact, Ibrahim 
discloses that Maitatsine group is considered un-Islamic by Muslim 
scholars as well (1987, 72). One does not know of any such 
indictment against Boko Haram other than extremism.  
Some argue that Boko Haram is more connected to Al-Qaeda 
(Crisis Group 2010, 19); however, there is no conclusive evidence to 
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that effect. Their link to Salafi
13
 philosophy through the Muslim 
Brotherhood of El-Zakzaky by Murtada appears more convincing. 
Murtada links the founder of Boko Haram, Muhammad Yusuf, to El-
Zakzaky’s Muslim Brotherhood. It is seen above how El-Zakzaky 
was influenced by Maududian ideology while in the university. 
Murtadadiscloses that it is when the group fractured that Muhammad 
Yusuf became one of the leaders of a fractured group. This agrees 
with the ‘split theory’ mentioned above. Muhammad Yusuf then 
went into association with the Izala group. This group also split and 
Yusuf went with his group and some students until they 
independently formed Jama’atAhl us-Sunnahli’d-Da’wahwa’lJihad 
now known as Boko Haram (Murtada 2012, 5-6). This possibly 
accounts for the strong presence of Maududian ideology in Boko 
Haram.  
 
Boko Haram Militancy Reflects Maududian Ideology 
A close examination of the philosophy and ideology of the group 
seems to reveal a marriage of both traditional and contemporary 
Salafi ideology of IbnTaymiyyah and Maududi respectively. Onuoha 
also acknowledges this Salafi connection (2014, 158-191). The 
original name of the group appears to be rooted in the exegesis of 
Taymiyyah on theAhl as-Sunnahwa al-Jama 'ah (The People of the 
Sunna and the community). According to IbnTaymiyyah, these are 
the people the prophet predicted will be one of the seventy three 
Islamic divisions that will arise after him. They are called Ahl as-
Sunnahwa al-Jama 'ah because they are the ones who will be saved. 
The reason is because they have no leader except the prophet and 
they only obey him in accordance with sura 53:3 since, as the verse 
says, Muhammad does not say anything out of his own desire. This 
group, he says, will be a small minority. He sums up that “it is clear 
from this that the people who will be saved are the people of 
hadithand Sunna, who do not have any leader other than the 
Prophet” (IbnTaymiyyah 2000, 548-551). This probably suggests the 
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group’s abhorrence to traditional Islamic leadership and resistance to 
main line traditional Islam. 
The rejection of secularism and demand for implementation of 
Shari’asome also trace back to IbnTaymiyyah (Mohammed 2014, 
14). The elevation of jihad above other religious obligations like 
Hajj, Umrah, Salat and fasting is also connected to his 
writing.
14
Taymiyyah argues that scholars agreed that jihad “is better 
than hajj and 'umrah, and better than supererogatory salahand 
fasting, as found in the Qur'an and the Sunna. The Prophet, to quote 
a few Ahadith, said, ‘The important thing is Islam (submission); its 
pillar is salahon which it stands, and jihadis its pinnacle’” (2000, 
540-542). This probably suggests why the group considers jihad the 
ultimate path to its objectives.  
On the other hand, the rejection of anything considered saturated 
with western values, western secularism or civilization, as Onuoha 
reported a clarification by an interim leader of the group in 2009 
(2014, 160), is apparently from a different source than Taymiyyah. 
The agitation for contemporary Islamic state through the use of jihad 
is not from him as well even if one argues the jihad link to him. 
These ideologies do exhibit a Maududian influence. 
As Nasr argues earlier, Maududi is the first Islamic thinker to 
develop a “systematic political reading of Islam and a plan for social 
action to realize his vision” (1996, 3). Scholars also agree he 
introduced the modern concept of Islamic state as seen 
above.Maududi also introduced the modern concept of din 
wadawla(The unity of religion and state), and the fulfillment of 
religious dictates demand the organization of a political system as 
per criteria of religion. It is, therefore, a religious duty to struggle for 
an Islamic state just like other religious obligations (Cheema 2013, 
52). Nasr’searlier argument is also pertinent that Maududi’s“creation 
of a coherent Islamic ideology, articulated in terms of the elaborate 
organization of an Islamic state, constitutes the essential 
breakthrough that led to the rise of contemporary revivalism” (1996, 
3).  
Thus, the marriage of religion and politics, as we see with Boko 
Haram, suggests a link to Maududi rather than IbnTaymiyyah. 
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Maududi adamantly insists that “separation of religion from politics 
had no place in Islam” (Nasr 1996, 39), “making politics sacred was 
a religious obligation” (Nasr 1996, 81), and “Islamization of politics 
would have to be implemented, even through coercion” (Nasr 1996, 
82). Taymiyyah’s position suggests that politics and religion are 
interdependent and not inseparable (2000, 506). 
The use of jihad to establish Islamic states is Maududi’s 
ideology (Khalidi 2003, 417), and, therefore, its means of coercion. 
Maududi states that the aim of jihadis “to eliminate the rule of an un-
Islamic system and establish in its stead an Islamic system of state 
rule” (1980, 22). Islam has no choice but to capture state Authority 
(1980, 19). The quest by Boko Haram and several Muslims across 
northern Nigeria to establish an Islamic state through the use of 
jihad, which employs coercion, has Maududian resonation. 
Furthermore, Maududi, unlike Taymiyyah, enjoins jihad against 
Muslim leaders who are considered un-Islamic. He states that “it is 
incumbent upon members of the party of Islam to carry out a 
revolution in the state system of the countries to which they belong” 
(1980, 22).  Boko Haram seems to be employing this philosophy by 
attacking fellow Muslims and leaders considered compromisers.
15
 
Contrary to the foregoing, IbnTaymiyyah cautions against 
rebellion (2000, 511), and says God enjoins obedience to authority 
(Amir) “even if he is a black slave,” and “even if he be a black 
African with (hair on the) head like raisins” (2000, 514). The only 
exception is if the ruler asks you to do something sinful (2000, 510). 
Obedience to the ruler is as incumbent as obedience to the pillars of 
Islam such as prayers, fasting, Zakat
16
 and pilgrimage (2000, 510). It 
is the establishment of an Islamic state that Maududi makes 
obligatory as the pillars of Islam, even if it means uprooting existing 
leaders who are Muslims (Cheema 2013, 52). 
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Furthermore, Taymiyyah says the most heinous treachery is 
against the ruler (2000, 512) because as the prophet said, “one who 
rises up against the ruler (sultan), even to the span of a hand, and 
dies in that state dies the death of the days of ignorance” (2000, 
513). Significantly,  the ruler is so crucial that he is the shadow of 
God on earth and as “the saying goes that sixty years under an unjust 
ruler is better than one night without a ruler” (2000, 503). Maududi, 
Boko Haramand several fundamentalists reject this position.  
Additionally, scholars have traced the anti –western rhetoric of 
extremist Islamic groups to Maududi. Jan argues that Maududi saw 
the threat to Islam as the western thought (2003, 503). Among the 
five principles that Demant says Maududi developed is anti-
Westernism (2006, 98). There is consensus that Maududi had a deep 
seated suspicion of westernization (Nasr 1996, 20; Khalidi 2003, 
417; Moten 2003, 396). And in his 1934 essay as discussed by 
Wood, Maududi “laments the corrupting influences of secular 
Western education on Muslim youth. Corrupted secularist Muslims, 
Mawdudi avers, reconfigure Islam along ―Christian lines” (2011, 
183). Boko Haram’s dislike for Christians rhymes with Maududian 
position.  
In a reported interview after his capture, the Boko Haram leader 
was asked why he uses technological gadgets and his response was 
“they are purely technological things not boko . . . and 
westernization is different” (Mohammed 2010, 105). This resembles 
what Nasr says about Maududi that he accepts modernity, but rejects 
westernization (1996, 50-51), and reiterates that “Maududi wanted to 
also Islamize modernity” (1996, 53). Cheema concurs that 
fundamentalists accept modernity, but reject Westernization (2013, 
55). The similarity becomes more apparent in the demands byBoko 
Haram for Christians to leave the north. As seen above, Maududi 
advocates that non-Muslims should leave the Islamic state if they 
refuse to accept Islam.  
Indeed, almost half of 159 interviewees agree that non-Muslims 
should leave an Islamic state if they are unwilling to comply with 
Shari’a. This is an example of the growing influence of Maududian 
philosophy even among main line Muslims in northern Nigeria. 
Although the interviews reveal a strong presence of Sunni Muslims 
averse to fundamentalist ideology, such as that of Maududi, it 




reflects the growing influence of Maududian ideology, not only 
within Boko Haram, but among mainline Muslims.  
Indeed, fundamentalist Islam, as Maududi’s writings expose, is 
also opposed to proselytization. And as evident in most religious 
conflicts since the 1980s in northern Nigeria, Christians and non-
Muslims have been accused of trying to proselytize Muslims and are 
attacked. Maududi’s interpretation of how non-Muslims should be 
treated in an Islamic state (1980, 27-28) appears implemented in 
attacks against Christians and non-Muslims even before the 12 states 
in northern Nigeria implemented Shari’a law in the 2000s (Murtada 
2012, 5; Mohammed 2014, 22). The anti-proselytization war started 
with radical Islamic students as discussed above, and also as 
reiterated by Falola (1998, 3). The above, therefore, makes it clear 
that religious conflicts and Boko Haram in northern Nigeria are 
strongly influenced by Maududian theological interpretation of 
Islam.   
 
Conclusion 
This paper has clearly established the link between theology or 
theological interpretation and Islamic fundamentalism or religious 
conflicts in northern Nigeria. Specifically, it has shown how 
Maududi’s political interpretation of Islam radicalized university 
students and how these students moved into the society and 
established fundamentalist groups such as Boko Haram. Although 
the paper did not deny the contribution of socio-economic and socio-
political factors or even the role of colonialism in fostering Muslim 
and non-Muslim tensions and conflicts, it has shown that the factors 
influencing religious or interreligious conflicts and fundamentalism 
like that of Boko Haram are beyond the often harped on socio-
economic and socio-political factors.  
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